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EXPROPRIATION BY EX PARTE ORDER FOR
HIGHWAY PURPOSES IN LOUISIANA
Glenn S. Dorsey*
At the risk of being immodest or, perhaps, of having an ac-
cusation of "extremism" leveled at me, I assert that the State
of Louisiana enjoys the benefits of the most advanced and ef-
fective type of expropriation statute designed for the acquisi-
tion of right of way for highways and their appurtenances.'
The provisions of this statute permit the acquisition of right of
way by a declaration of taking and the statute is closely pat-
terned after the Federal Declaration of Taking Act ;2 it is some-
times referred to as a "quick-taking statute. '3  The similarity
of the state statute to the federal statute has enabled the legal
representatives of the State of Louisiana and the Department
of Highways to utilize the decisions of the federal jurisprudence
in seeking guidance for the application and interpretation of the
state statute.
Before proceeding, certain basic concepts and distinctions of
the law of expropriation, as applied in Louisiana, should be
made clear. As is well known, "authority is universal in sup-
port of the amplified definition of eminent domain as the power
of the sovereign to take property for public use without the
owner's consent upon making just compensation."' 4 The terms
eminent domain, condemnation, and expropriation are essentially
synonymous and, of course, refer to the compulsory taking of
property for public use, though "expropriation" is the proper
legal terminology in Louisiana. "Appropriation" in Louisiana
refers to the assumption of ownership, use, control, or possession
of property without legal right. It appears that in many states
"appropriation" is a stronger and more emphatic assertion of
a taking than is the case in Louisiana, where "expropriation"
is the firmer and more emphatic assertion of the right to take
*Assistant General Counsel, Louisiana Department of Highways.
1. La. Acts 1954, No. 107, now LA. R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1965).
2. 46 Stat. 1421-22 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-258e (1964).
3. State v. Hayward, 243 La. 1036, 150 So. 2d 6 (1963) ; State v. Dodge, 166
So. 2d 286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
4. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN 4, at § 1.11 (1917).
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property. The property right designated as an "easement" in
other states is designated as a "servitude" in Louisiana; "ease-
ment" is foreign to the legal terminology of Louisiana. For
purposes of expropriation, the word "property" may mean im-
movable property, whether corporeal or incorporeal (servitude).5
Thus, the expropriation of movable property or personalty, as
defined by the jurisprudence, is not permitted, which appears
to be contrary to the law of eminent domain in, at least, a few
states. In 1948, the use of juries in expropriation cases was
abolished and it was provided that such cases should be tried
before the court without a jury."
Historically and prior to the adoption of appropriate consti-
tutional and legislative provisions relating to the method of
acquiring highway right of way exclusively, expropriation pro-
ceedings, both as to substantive and procedural law, were con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of the law commonly
referred to as the general expropriation law; these provisions
are interlarded throughout the code and statutory law of Louisi-
ana and, as to the substantive law, continue to be the basis and
authority for the talking of property and property rights, not
only for highway purposes but also for the taking of property
by all other public bodies and quasi-public bodies clothed with
the power of expropriation. In 1948, in order to eliminate the
extensive delays incidental to the acquisition of highway right
of way under the general expropriation law, an amendment to
the Constitution of Louisiana was adopted and became effective
December 10, 1948. 7 This amendment provided for the taking
of property for highway purposes by orders rendered ex parte
prior to judgment and the deposit of the estimated compensation
in the registry of the appropriate court before the taking and
for the property taken. Based on this amendment, an enabling
act had been adopted by the legislature in the same year8 designed
to permit the Department of Highways to take possession of a
parcel of land immediately upon the deposit of the value of the
property taken and damages to the remainder, if any, prior to
judgment in the trial court, as determined by three appraisers
appointed by the court after the filing of the expropriation suit.
As stated, the constitutional amendment was ratified, making the
5. LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950).
6. Id. 19:4.
7. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1.
8. LA. R.S. 19:51-66 (1950).
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enabling act operative, but only one petition for expropriation
was filed pursuant to this special highway procedure, since the
minimum delays, though shortened, did not afford adequate
relief for an expanding highway construction program and the
statute never came into regular and consistent use, though its
provisions are still available.
Subsequent to this effort to quicken the judicial process by
which highway right of way could be acquired with increasing
benefit to the Department of Highways and in a further effort
to produce a faster procedure without doing violence to the basic
law of the state or to the basic rights of the individual, a study
was initiated by the legal section of the Department of High-
ways. This was particularly desirable since the earlier special
highway procedure did not fully utilize the latitude inherent in
the provisions of the constitutional amendment to which refer-
ence has been made.9 The study culminated in the drafting
and submission to the legislature of an act providing for a de-
claration of taking by ex parte order prior to judgment in the
trial court; this act was adopted by the legislature and became
effective June 24, 1954,10 and has since been utilized exclusively
for the acquisition of all rights of way in the State of Louisiana
by expropriation proceedings. The several provisions of this
act will be discussed in somewhat greater detail. The great dif-
ference between the 1948 special highway procedure and the
statute enacted in 1954 is the delay in the actual taking of
the property and vesting of title in the Department of High-
ways. In the former procedure, vesting of title occurred only
after the suit had been filed, a valuation of the property made
and damages, if any, assessed by appraisers appointed by the
court and the appraised valuation deposited in the registry of the
court; in the later procedure, vesting of title occurs simul-
taneously with the filing of the suit, the signing of the ex
parte order of expropriation and the deposit of the estimated
compensation in the registry of the court, prior to judgment in
the trial court. Both of these statutes are wholly procedural in
character and content and do not confer on the Department of
Highways any greater substantive legal rights than those for-
merly enjoyed or those contained in the provisions of the general
expropriation law. The title of the 1954 act specifically states
that the enactment provides an additional method by which the
9. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1.
10. LA R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1965).
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Department of Highways may expropriate property and the
procedure in such cases.
As I believe is the case in most states, the right to take
private property for a public use or for public utility is circum-
scribed by specific state constitutional limitations, as well as the
applicable federal constitutional limitations. In Louisiana, these
constitutional restrictions are contained primarily in two provi-
sions of the Constitution of 1921 ;11 the first reads:
"Section 2. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law. Except as other-
wise provided in this Constitution, private property shall
not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after
just and adequate compensation is paid."
and the second reads:
"Section 15. No ex-post facto law, nor any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, shall be passed; nor shall vested
rights be divested, unless for purposes of public utility, and
for just and adequate compensation previously paid."
These articles of the Constitution relative to restrictions on
the exercise of the right of eminent domain evolved from the
language of every constitution since 1845.12 In the only prior
!Constitution, that of 1812, the language of the corresponding
provision is obscure3 and it was not until the adoption of the
Constitution of 1879 that language was included in the organic
law which provided for the payment of compensation for
damage to private property in addition to the earlier require-
ment of compensation for the taking of property.14 It is in-
teresting to consider the interpretation by the Supreme Court
of the applicable provision of the Constitution of 1879 in a case
decided in 1889.15
11. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 15 (1921).
12. La. Const. art. 109 (1845).
13. La. Const. art. VI, § 20 (1812).
14. La. Const. art. 156 (1879).
15. McMahon and Perrin v. St. Louis, A. & T. R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 829,
6 So. 640, 641 (1889): "Prior to the Constitution of 1879 the organic law of
this State, like that of all the States of this Union, simply provided that 'Private
property shall not be taken for public purposes without adequate compensation,
etc.' Under this rule, in absence of other special provision, a taking of the prop-
erty was a condition precedent to liability and the measure of compensation due
was the value of the property taken. Mere consequential damage to property,
when the property itself was not taken, was not recoverable; and much less any
damages resulting to individual owners, in the way of discomfort, inconvenience,
[Vol. XXVI
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Addressing this discussion specifically to the provisions of
the 1954 statute which is currently employed in Louisiana for
expropriation of property and property rights for highway
purposes, I shall examine the jurisprudence predicated on and
developed from the provisions of this statute during the period
since its passage. In Louisiana, two factors must exist before
expropriation proceedings can be instituted, that is, the land-
owner must refuse to yield the property required or the land-
owner demands an exorbitant price. Also, and in accordance
with the concepts already mentioned, the essentials for an ex-
propriation suit are: (1) that the taking must be for a public
use or public utility and (2) that adequate compensation must
be paid. The expropriation of property in Louisiana in a sum-
mary manner by ex parte orders and prior to judgment is
authorized by the constitutional provision earlier mentioned. 6
The first serious legal attack made against its use and ap-
plication was the assertion of unconstitutionality. This claim
was predicated on several grounds, namely, that no provision
had been made for the payment of compensation prior to a taking
for a public purpose, that the ex parte orders of expropriation
authorized could be issued only at the discretion of the trial
court, that the statute permitted an ex parte taking and im-
mediate possession without a prior opportunity to be heard and
without any hearing whatsoever as to the necessity of the taking;
and it was claimed that all these contentions offended both the
loss of business and the like. All such injuries, inasmuch as they resulted only
from the exercise by another of his legal right, were damna absque injuria.
"The Article 156 of the present Constitution, in providing that 'private prop-
erty shall not be taken nor damaged for public purposes without adequate com-
pensation, etc.,' only extended its protecting shield over one additional injury and
required compensation, not only for property taken, but also for property dam-
aged.
"As in the case of a taking the measure of compensation is the value of the
property taken, so in the case of damage, the measure of compensation is the
diminution in the value of the property.
"There is no warrant for extending the liability one whit beyond this. We are
simply to inquire what damage has been done to the property, i.e., to its value
for rental and sale. Mere consequential injuries to the owners arising from dis-
comfort, disturbance, injury to business and the like, remain, as they were before,
damna absque injuria, particular sacrifices which society has the right to inflict
for the public good."
16. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 19.1 (1921) : "The Legislature shall have authority
to authorize the taking of property for highway purposes by orders rendered
ex parte in expropriation suits prior to judgment therein provided that provision
be made for deposit before such taking with a court officer for the amount of
appraisals of the property so taken and damages to which the owner thereof may
be entitled, if any, which appraisals may be made in such manner as may be
provided by law either before or after institution of suit, and need not be by
judicially appointed appraisers."
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Louisiana constitutional provisions cited above, as well as
others, 17 and federal constitutional due process requirements. 18
These attacks on the constitutionality of the summary procedure
authorized by the 1954 statute were resolved in 1958 in a case9
decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which rejected all
arguments of constitutional nullity advanced for the property
owners.
The petition in an expropriation suit, pursuant to the terms
of the 1954 statute, must contain the allegations required by
R.S. 19:2.1 of the general expropriation law, including the re-
quirement for a plat or plan of survey of the property to be taken
and a description of the improvements situated thereon, if any,
and it is practically the same petition as that which has always
been used, with the addition of certain exhibits.20  These exhibits
are (1) a certified copy of the resolution adopted by the Board
of Highways showing that not less than two-thirds of the Board
consider the taking necessary or useful for highway purposes,
17. Id. art. I, § 6; art. II, §§ 1, 2; art. VII, § 3.
18. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
19. State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 1024, 106 So. 2d 455, 456 (1958) : "We
cannot agree with defendants' contention that the constitutional provision grants
the Legislature power to authorize only such ex parte expropriation orders as
are to be issued at the discretion of the trial court. The legislative requirement
that the trial court 'shall issue an order' of expropriation upon the Department's
compliance with the statutory prerequisites does not exceed the authority con-
ferred by the constitutional provision to the Legislature 'to authorize the taking
of property for highway purposes by orders rendered ex parte in expropriation
suits prior to judgment therein.'
"But the evident purpose of Article VI, Section 19.1, was to authorize such
ex parte takings prior to judgments formerly and otherwise prohibited by the
State constitutional provisions now relied upon by the respondent property owners
herein. This governing constitutional enactment, of course, overrides within its
scope earlier expressions and holdings cited to the effect that the necessity of
the taking is a matter for judicial determination ....
"Respondents' final contention is that Act 107 of 1954 offends federal due
process requirements. This argument has little merit. As the United States Su-
preme Court stated in Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 40 S.Ct. 62, 64 L.Ed. 135,
in upholding a State enactment similarly to the present Louisiana statute per-
mitting an ex parte taking with immediate possession for highway purposes with-
out any hearing whatsoever provided as to the necessity of the taking although
with an eventual full judicial hearing (if desired) upon the property owner's
claim for compensation, 251 U.S. 58-59, 40 S.Ct. 63:
"'Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediency of the taking
may be determined by such agency and in such mode as the state may designate.
They are legislative questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision,
and a hearing thereon is not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....
" '... [I] t is settled by the decisions of this court that where adequate provi-
sion is made for the certain payment of the compensation without unreasonable
delay, the taking does not contravene due process of law in the sense of the
Fourteenth Amendment merely because it precedes the ascertainment of what
compensation is just ... ."
20. L . R.S. 48:442 (Supp. 1965).
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(2) the certificate of the Chief Engineer declaring that the
width of the right of way has been fixed, as required by law,
and in the interest of the general public both presently and in
the future, (3) a copy of the plat or plan mentioned previously,
(4) the certificate of location and design which is executed by
the Director of Highways and those engineers charged with the
responsibility of locating and designing highways and declares
that the best modern practices and designs have been adopted
for the particular project, and (5) the certificate showing the
estimate of just compensation due the particular landowner, in-
cluding an estimate of damages as a separate item, if any. The
petition concludes with a prayer that the property be declared
taken for highway purposes, that the amount of the estimate
of just compensation be deposited in the registry of the court
and that the property described in the petition be declared taken
at the time of the deposit. These exhibits are evidence of the
motivating theory of the 1954 statute that the public officers
and employees engaged in the construction and maintenance of
the state highway system are fully qualified and responsible
public officials and have not acted arbitrarily or without proper
and adequate consideration of the public needs as well as the
rights of the individual.
Upon the deposit in the registry of the court of the amount
estimated to be due the landowner, title to the property and
property rights described in the petition vest in the Department
of Highways. This estimate is made prior to filing suit by ap-
praisers selected by the Right of Way Engineer, two of whom
must be qualified as licensed realtors or qualified right of way
agents in the regular employment of the Department. No delay
is encountered in obtaining the estimate as it is secured prior
to and during negotiations with the landowner and before filing
suit. The order of expropriation signed by the judge at the
time of filing suit and the receipt of the clerk of court for the
money deposited are recorded in the conveyance records of the
parish in which the property is situated, thus effecting notice
to the public of the transfer to the Department of Highways of
title to the property taken. As a corollary to the vesting of title,
there is the matter of the surrender of possession by the land-
owner. Provision is made in the statute2 1 for immediate pos-
session in those cases in which no buildings are located wholly
21. Id. 48:448.
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or partially on the property taken; in those cases in which any
buildings are located wholly or partially on the property taken,
the right of possession may be postponed by the court for any
period not to exceed thirty days from the date on which the last
of any parties defendant was served with notice of the expro-
priation.2 2 Along with other portions of the 1954 statute, these
provisions for vesting of title and right of entry to take posses-
sion have proved very advantageous in securing the necessary
rights of way without undue delay and in permitting the con-
struction of the project to proceed in an orderly manner in ac-
cordance with program schedules without being impeded by the
strategy of delay formerly employed by the property owner;
this procedure is accomplished without the loss of any legal
rights by the landowner, as will be indicated.
It was not until 1960 that one of the most controversial issues
engendered by the statute was settled; this was whether or not
the question of necessity for the taking of the property was a
judicial or legislative question. The statute provides that notice
must be given every defendant property owner affected 23 who
may contest the validity of the taking upon the sole ground that
the property was not expropriated for a public use or purpose.24
There is a difference between "public use" and "necessity"; the
former refers to the public use or purpose to which the property
is to be devoted, while the latter challenges the propriety of the
taking, including the extent of the taking, its advisability, and
expediency. This is a distinction some courts and many lawyers
fail to recognize or seem unwilling to recognize with the result
that legal pleadings continue to be filed alleging there is no
necessity for the taking and confusing this with the right to
contest the matter of public use. The statute provides for the
filing of a motion to dismiss the expropriation suit within ten
days from the date notice is served on the defendant 25 on the
sole ground that the property has not been taken for a public
use and that failure to file such a motion in time constitutes a
waiver of all defenses to the suit except claims for compensa-
tion.26 From the time of the adoption of this legislation, the
attorneys for the Department of Highways assumed the legal
position that the question of necessity was no longer a judicial
22. Ibid.
23. Id. 48:446.
24. Id. 48:447.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
[Vol. XXVI
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question, in view of the wording of the statute, the change in
the procedure for expropriation of property for highway pur-
poses and the annexation to the petition of the certificates of
responsible officials, as well as other exhibits, all of which in-
dicated that it was not the intent of the statute to require proof
of necessity of the taking in an expropriation suit for highway
purposes. However, as this statute made no change in the pro-
cedural aspects of the general expropriation law, the issue of
the necessity of the taking continues to be a question which is
subject to judicial review under the general law. Consequently,
the case 27 decided by the Supreme Court in 1960 settled the issue
of whether proof of the necessity of the taking is required.
With the rendition of the decisions in the two cases2" dis-
cussed, two major issues, constitutionality and necessity of the
taking, were removed from the realm of litigation in expropria-
tion matters for highway purposes. This situation has proved
to be of vast assistance to the State of Louisiana and the Depart-
ment of Highways in accelerating the acquisition of right of
way and the construction of highway projects throughout the
state, particularly in promoting the highway program related
to the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.
However, interpretations of other provisions of the statute re-
mained to be determined by court decisions.
The statute provides for a motion to dismiss2 9 an expropria-
27. State v. Guidry, 240 La. 516, 520, 124 So. 2d 531, 532 (1960) : "The pri-
mary issue for our consideration is whether the question of the necessity for the
taking of property expropriated by the Highway Department under Article VI,
Section 19.1, of the Constitution and Act 107 of 1954 (LSA-R.S. 48:441-48:460)
is subject to judicial review.
"Prior to the enactment of Act 107 of 1954 the owner of expropriated prop-
erty was entitled to contest the question of necessity of the taking before the
courts, and may still so do when the property has been expropriated under the
general expropriation laws of the State. . . . With the adoption of constitutional
Article VI, Section 19.1, and Act 107 of 1954, however, when the Highway De-
partment expropriates property under these provisions, there are only two ques-
tions which the courts may determine: (1) the adequacy of the compensation,
and (2) whether the property was taken for a public purpose. Decisions relied
upon by the Court of Appeal in reaching its decision that the question of the
necessity or expediency of the taking 'by the Highway Department for highway
purposes is subject to judicial review are no longer controlling. Where the in-
tended use is public, the necessity and expediency of the taking may be determined
by such agency and in such a manner as the State may designate. They are legis-
lative questions no matter who may be charged with their decision. . . . In
Louisiana, the Legislature has delegated to the Highway Department the power
to determine the necessity for expropriating property for highway purposes and
the owner of land expropriated has no constitutional right to have the depart-
ment's decision as to the necessity thereof reviewed in judicial proceedings."
28. State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958) ; State v. Guidry,
240 La. 516, 124 So. 2d 531 (1960).
29. LA. R.S. 48:447 (Supp. 1965).
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tion suit by the filing of such a motion on the sole ground that
the property is not being taken for a public use,30 and this
motion must be filed within ten days of the date of service of
process. Moreover, the statute provides that the Department
of Highways shall not be divested by court order of any title
acquired under these provisions except where such court finds
that the property was not taken for a public use.31 Neither does
the filing of a motion to dismiss delay the taking of possession;
that no such delay can occur reasonably follows from the fact
that it is now clear that title cannot be divested without the
filing of the motion on the sole ground mentioned and a finding
by the court that the property has not been taken for a public
use. That these two conditions must coincide is quite apparent
not only from the language of the statute but also from the
jurisprudence of Louisiana. The following language was used by
the Supreme Court in a decision32 on this subject:
"But, even were it otherwise, the judge was without right
to set aside the order of expropriation on a motion to dis-
miss in the absence of a finding that the property was not
taken for a public use. . . . Therefore, without a showing
by respondent that the property was not taken for a public
use, relator could not have been lawfully divested of its title.
." (Emphasis added.)
Neither does the filing of a motion to dismiss hold the litiga-
tion in abeyance or delay possession until disposition has been
made of the motion. This phase of the development of the statute
is mentioned for the reason that, originally at least, many at-
torneys assumed that the motion to dismiss could be filed and
the lawsuit permitted to remain dormant until some further ac-
tion was desired or indicated. If this were true, a defendant could,
by the simple device of filing a motion to dismiss, whether bona
fide or frivolous, extend and enlarge the period of time in which
to file an answer. Such a possibility, if allowed by the court,
would nullify the intent and purpose of the statute and continue
to permit the strategy of delay by the property owner to domi-
nate the litigation, and interfere with and deny the right of the
Department of Highways to the accelerated procedure intended.
30. State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958).
31. LA. R.S. 48:460 (Supp. 1965).
32. State v. Win. T. Burton Industries, Inc., 231 La. 360, 365, 91 So. 2d 375,
377 (1956).
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Related to the filing of the motion to dismiss is the period
of time in which an answer may be filed by the defendant prop-
erty owner. In the case of a total taking, the property owner
must file an answer within thirty days from the date the de-
fendant is served with notice.33 In the case of a partial taking,
the property owner must file an answer within one year from
the date the defendant is notified in writing that the construc-
tion of the highway project for which the property was ex-
propriated has been accepted finally. 34 The requirement that
the answer be filed within the periods of time stated by the
statute is not postponed or prolonged by the filing of a motion
to dismiss and disposition by the court; neither is the court
authorized to grant an extension of time in which to file an
answer to the suit, whether or not a motion to dismiss is filed.
Both of these procedural aspects of the statute have been deter-
mined by appellate courts of final resort. That an answer must
be timely filed, in the case of a total taking, has been decided by
two cases. In the first case,3 5 no motion to dismiss had been
filed but two successive extensions of time in which to answer
had been granted ex parte by the court. In disposing of this
case, the court decided the issue with reference to the timely
filing of an answer pursuant to the statute. And, in the same
case, the court also decided the issue with reference to granting
an extension of time in which to file an answer. In the second
case,36 a motion to dismiss had been filed and was eventually
33. LA. R.S. 48:450 (Supp. 1965).
34. Id. 48:451.
35. State v. Higgins, 135 So. 2d 306, 308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) : "Further,
LSA-R.S. 48:450 grants the defendant the right to apply for a trial to determine
the fair market value of his property, provided that he files an answer within
thirty days. Although we think this section clearly means that the defendant
forfeits his right of action to demand additional compensation unless he meets
the requirements of the statute, our interpretation thereof is further substantiated
by the rationale of LSA-R.S. 48:452, which provides that the defendant waives
all defenses by failing to file an answer timely. If the legislature had intended to
reserve the right to defendant to claim additional compensation, even though he
failed to answer timely it certainly would have specifically provided therefor in
R.S. 48:452 as it did in LSA-R.S. 48:447.
"In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we are fully cognizant of the fact that
the trial court granted the defendant two extensions of time in which to file an
answer, and incidentally, these periods of time actually expired before the de-
fendant chose to reply to the suit. However, that fact is insignificant because
the extensions were unauthorized by the statutory law. The court engaged in a
futile gesture when it authorized a delayed answer, which was clearly forbidden
by the legislature. The courts are interpreters not creators of the law. There
exists no place in our Constitution for judicial hegemony, to reason otherwise
would result in chaos."
36. State v. Jackson Brewing Co., 146 So. 2d 504, 507 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962) : "In our opinion, LSA-R.S. 48:447 providing for the filing of a motion
1965]
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disposed of; in this case, however, the attorneys for the prop-
erty owner indulged in a calculated risk, it appears, and did
not file an answer until the motion had received final disposi-
tion, though the answer was filed within thirty days of such
disposition, this case being a total taking.
In the case of a partial taking, in which a claim to severance
damage may arise, no reported case has been decided favorably
to the Department of Highways under the section of the statute
to the effect that any defendant may apply for a trial to deter-
mine the just and adequate compensation to which he is entitled,
provided the defendant files an answer within one year from
the date he is notified in writing of the final acceptance of the
construction of the project.3 7 This particular section has proved
to be ineffective and extremely controversial, though the intent
and purpose is constructive and laudable. As has been stated
by the author of the act, this provision of the statute represents
an experiment in procedure and its purpose is to attempt to
avoid high or excessive awards based on damage, if any, which
is to occur in the future. The defendant is fully protected, since
the original deposit of estimated just compensation is always
available to him and he is entitled to interest at the legal rate
on any increase in compensation which may be awarded on the
trial of the case. Under this provision, the defendant would not
risk overlooking items of damage which might not be readily
foreseeable and, on the other hand, the Department of High-
ways would not encounter the risk of being assessed for an
item of damage which may not actually occur. The court can
assess damages on the basis of the existing situation with jus-
tice and fairness to both parties. This procedure has proved to
be extremely controversial, as stated, and cannot be said to
have enjoyed the confidence or thoughtful consideration of the
courts. Notwithstanding the vigorous efforts of attorneys for
the Department of Highways in urging the courts to require
compliance with this section of the statute, the courts have in-
sistently and steadfastly permitted the property owner to assert
to dismiss within ten days from receipt of notice of the expropriation and LSA-
R.S. 48:450 requiring that a defendant applying for a trial as to market value
must file his answer 'within thirty days from the date he is served with a notice,'
are clear and free from all ambiguity. There is nothing contained in either sec-
tion, or in any other portion of this entire statute, which even suggests that if a
motion to dismiss is filed, then the period of time in which to file an answer is
extended or enlarged in the manner for which defendant contends. The language
of Section 450 is not conditional, contingent or subjunctive in any manner. It in
clear, positive and unambiguous ..
37. LA. R.S. 48:451 (1950).
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a claim for damages without compliance. One case38 illustrates
the attitude of the courts on this subject. In a second case,39
the court supported the former view.
It is interesting to observe that in several cases, not reported,
the property owners have considered it beneficial to their inter-
ests to rely on this provision and to await the completion of the
project before proceeding with the litigation. It is also inter-
esting to observe that of the four cases to date in which the
Department of Highways has urged the courts to enforce com-
pliance with the statute in this respect three cases were decided
in the same appellate court; only one case in which this section
was considered occurred in a different appellate court and this
case involved the time when the period of a year commenced
in which the property owner could act4" rather than a considera-
tion of the intent and purpose of the section as a whole.
It was stated earlier in this paper that the accelerated pro-
cedure now currently in use was achieved without the loss of
any legal rights of the landowner. This is believed to be a cor-
rect estimate of the position of the landowner for, in addition
38. State v. Williams, 131 So. 2d 600, 605 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) : "Before
concluding, we should add that the appellant Department has re-urged on appeal
a motion for continuance, based upon the premise that an action for severance
damages by reason of an expropriation under LSA-R.S. 48:441 et seq. (Act 107
of 1954) is premature, 'where a portion of a * * * tract of land is expropriated,'
until the landowner 'is notified in writing by the department that it has finally
accepted the construction of the highway project for which the property was
expropriated,' quoted language being from LSA-R.S. 48:451. From the language
and context of this statutory provision, however, it is apparent that the legisla-
ture was providing the delay within which answer to such expropriation suits
must be filed which seek further judicial proceedings to determine the compensa-
tion to which the landowner is entitled (if any) beyond the amount deposited
with the ex parte taking (LSA-R.S. 48:445). While the Act provides that a
failure to file the answer timely constitutes a waiver by the landowner of any
defenses to the suit (LSA-R.S. 48:453), and thus of his right to contest the
Department's deposited valuation of his property, the enactment does not provide
that a landowner may not file his answer earlier than the delays provided by
LSA-R.S. 48:450 and 451 and thus 'be able to secure an earlier judicial determina-
tion of the compensation to which he is entitled by reason of the taking."
39. State v. Davis, 149 So. 2d 164, 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) : "Under
LSA-R.S. 48:451 the landowner has the right to claim these damages up to a
year from the date the highway department notifies him it has accepted the
construction of the highway project for which the property was expropriated.
Counsel re-urges the Department's contention that suits for severance damages
are therefore premature until after final construction and acceptance of the
highway project, although this perhaps may not take place until several years
after the taking. We have previously rejected this contention and have held that
the statutory provision permitting such long delay within which the landowner
may judicially assert his claim for severance damages, does not prevent the land-
owner from filing his claim earlier and securing a more prompt judicial deter-
mination of the severance damages and loss of value to which he is entitled as a
result of the taking."
40. State v. Freyer, 129 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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to the preservation of the right to seek compensation in excess
of the deposit made on account of just and adequate compensa-
tion, the court may order that the deposit be paid forthwith to
the person or persons entitled thereto upon presentation of an
appropriate written order to withdraw the same without prej-
udice to the rights of the landowner.41 The statute also pro-
vides for the payment of interest at the rate of five per centum
(the legal rate in Louisiana) on the amount awarded in excess
of the amount deposited from the date title vested in the De-
partment of Highways. 42 A further provision authorizes the
court to make an equitable distribution of the amount finally
awarded, if such judicial distribution is required. 43 Finally, in
the event title of the Department of Highways is divested by
reason of a finding by the court that the property expropriated
has not been taken for a public use, judgment may be rendered
to compensate the landowner .for the period of time during
which the property was in possession of the Department and
to recover for the Department any award paid. 44
These remarks, I believe, include the more important high-
lights of the jurisprudence established to this time affecting the
more controversial provisions of the declaration of taking
statute of Louisiana. There are, however, two related matters
that should be placed in juxtaposition to the expropriation
statute and the jurisprudence. These are the matters of an
appeal of a judgment in an expropriation suit and the reserva-
tion of minerals and mineral rights to the property owner in
those cases in which a fee title or full ownership is expropriated.
The 1954 statute provides "no appeal in any expropriation
suit brought under these provisions shall operate to prevent
or delay the vesting of title in the plaintiff"4 5 and this language
clearly implies that a suspensive appeal is not available. How-
ever, the statute likewise includes a section 46 to the effect that,
except as provided, expropriation suits are to be tried in accord-
ance with the general expropriation laws and these laws,47 as
well as an identical civil code enactment,48 provide, in part:
41. LA. R.S. 48:449 (1950).
42. Id. 48:455.
43. Id. 48:457.
44. Id. 48:460.
45. Id. 48:459.
46. Id. 48:454.
47. Id. 19:13.
48. LA. CIvI CODa art. 2634 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 92.
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"No party to any expropriation proceeding shall be entitled
to or granted a suspensive appeal from any order, judgment,
or decree rendered in such proceeding, whether such order,
judgment, or decree is on the merits, exceptions, or special
pleas and defenses, or any or all of them. The whole of the
judgment, however, shall be subject to the decision of the
appellate court on review under a devolutive appeal."
This final resolution of the question of whether a suspensive
appeal is available is summarized in this excerpt :49
"Articles 2634 and 2636 of the Civil Code have been
amended by Act 92 of 1960 to strengthen the statement in
the first sentence of Article 2634, forbidding suspensive ap-
peals in expropriation cases. The new amendment clearly
precludes suspensive appeals from any facet of an expropria-
tion proceeding."
Prior to 1958, there was some obscurity as to the legal right
of the Department of Highways to reserve to a property owner
minerals and royalties with respect to the expropriation of land
in full ownership. In 1958, an act50 was adopted by the legisla-
ture that set this matter at rest and it is now established prac-
tice to include in all expropriation suits an allegation effecting
such reservation where title is taken in fee or full ownership.
STATUTORY 'RAPE: A CRITIQUE
In the evolution of statutory criminal law two classes of
crimes have emerged in which knowledge and consequently in-
tent are no longer demanded.' One of these classes is "public
welfare offenses." These crimes are violations of statutes de-
signed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the com-
munity at large and they extend, for example, to the sale of
49. Legislative Symposium of 1960-Civil Code and Related Subject Matter,
21 LA. L. REV. 53, 62 (1960).
50. LA. R.S.. 9:5806 (1950).
1. Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 642, 71 So. 915, 916 (1916) : "While all com-
mon-law crimes consist of two elements-the criminal act or omission, and the
mental element, commonly called criminal intent, it is within the power of the
Legislature to dispense with the necessity for a criminal intent, and to punish
particular acts without regard to the mental attitude of the doer." See also Sayre,
The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 399, 407 (1934); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLU-M. L. REV.
55 (1933).
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